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ABSTRACT 
 Today’s rail industry is the outcome of years of regulatory and technological 
change.  Since the passage of the Staggers Rail Act of 1980 the industry has seen 
consolidation through mergers and acquisitions.  
  The rail industry in Montana has a rich rail history that includes the 
completion of a northern east-west route over 100 years ago that provided a 
commerce route from the interior of the US heartland to the ocean ports in the 
Pacific Northwest.  In those hundred years the rail traffic across Montana has seen 
dramatic change.  In the past, those routes have provided access for Montana 
freight; today those routes primarily serve the needs of consumers and industries 
far beyond Montana.   
 While the state’s economy is primarily agricultural, the largest user of rail 
transportation is the energy industry.  This leaves the agriculture industry with a 
lower priority for access, providing a quandary for rail service for the grain industry 
in the state. 
 In a state where more than eight national and regional rail carriers once 
operated, Montana is now only serviced by a small handful, one of which operates 
over 80% of the rail miles within its borders.  Furthermore that carrier provides 
service through those regions that are almost strictly agricultural, needing the 
greatest access to the most cost effective means of transportation for the bulk 
movement of grain.   
 The objectives of this thesis are to develop a model to measure railroad 
costs and competition; determine the principal cost determinants and measure 
intramodal competition by comparing the rates in a captive market (Montana) to 
one with more intramodal competition (Kansas).     
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
      Railroads are important for shipping agricultural commodities from producing 
regions to the domestic processing locations and export ports.  These shipments 
typically involve large scale movements of a bulk commodity over long distances, 
markets in which railroads have a cost advantage relative to other modes.  This is 
the situation in Montana where 70% of the Montana wheat crop is shipped by rail 
to Portland and Seattle for export. 
 Railroads were the most heavily regulated transportation mode prior the 
passage of the Staggers Rail Act in 1980.  Deregulation gave the railroads a great 
deal of pricing flexibility that was previously unavailable.  Prices could be set as 
low as variable cost and as high as 180% of variable cost without Interstate 
Commerce Commission (ICC) jurisdiction or review.  The Staggers Act set time 
limits for ICC decisions regarding abandonments and mergers.  Thus Class I 
railroads were able to quickly abandon or sell branchlines that lost money.  
Mergers reduced the number of Class I railroads from 40 in 1980 to seven today. 
 Deregulation led to railroad pricing innovations.  The introduction of unit 
trains (also called shuttle trains) rewarded shippers for large volume movements.  
Unit trains typically involve shipments of one commodity in a 100-110 car train 
between a single origin and destination.  The train stays together as a unit which 
means cars and locomotives of a unit train aren’t periodically assigned to other 
movements.  Unit trains significantly reduce railroad costs per ton-mile and thus 
rail prices are relatively low for unit train service. 
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 In some locations deregulation created the necessity to improve efficiency 
and service since railroads faced intramodal competition that did not exist prior to 
1980. This competition led to lower rail prices.  For example, Babcock et al. (1985) 
found that export wheat rates from many Kansas origins increased an average of 
64% in the four years prior to 1980 and then fell 34% in the four years after 1980 
as a result of intramodal competition (trucks and water carriers are non-competitive 
modes for these shipments).  MacDonald (1989) also found that intermodal 
competition from barges has strong effects on rail rates.  The farther the shipper is 
from competing water transportation, the higher railroad grain rates rise.  For 
example, wheat shippers located 400 miles from water competition paid rates 40% 
greater than shippers 100 miles from water competition.  MacDonald (1989) also 
found that intramodal competition has a major impact on rail grain rates; he found 
that moving from a monopoly to a duopoly in a corn market reduced rates by 18%, 
and moving further to a triopoly reduced rates another 11%. 
 Some of the trends previously discussed have occurred in Montana.  Prior 
to 1970, Montana was serviced by six Class I railroads.  The trend towards 
consolidation and mergers generating significant impacts began in 1970.  The 
largest of those consolidations was the Great Northern and the Northern Pacific 
merging to become part of the Burlington Northern (BN) line.  Two other Class I 
railroads were also part of that merger, bringing a total of four Montana Class I 
railroads to the BN entity.  This merger allowed the BN to operate both the 
northern and southern east-west railroads in the state.  At the time the only other 
Class I railroad left with an east-west line to compete with BN was the Chicago, 
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Milwaukee, St. Paul and Pacific Railroad (Milwaukee Road or MILW), however the 
company was in poor financial condition.  While the State of Montana made an 
attempt to purchase the MILW in 1980, it ultimately was unable to and the 
properties that were not sold to BN and Union Pacific (UP) were abandoned.  
Table 1.1 reflects the railroads in Montana in 2008. 
 Montana is a captive market for railroad shipment of wheat.  The degree of 
intermodal competition is limited due to the great distances to barge loading 
facilities and export ports.  Montana's nearest barge loading facility is Lewiston, 
Idaho, located over 400 miles from major Montana wheat growing areas.  Thus, 
limits on rail rates due to barge competition are likely to be negligible.  Further, the 
great distances from Montana origins to Pacific Northwest ports suggest that 
railroads have a substantial cost advantage over trucks in transporting Montana's 
wheat. 
Table 1.1: Railroads Operating in Montana, 2008 
 
Railroad Mileage Employees
Class I
Burlington and Santa Fe 
Railway Company 2135 2,236
Union Pacific 125 N/A
Class II
Regional Montana Rail Link 812 942
Dakota Missouri Valley and 
Western Railroad, Inc. 57 4
Local Railroads
Central Montana Rail, Inc. 87 6
Montana Western Railway Co 59 16
Rarus Railway Company 69 13
Source: Montana Department of Transportation  
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 Intramodal competition is also limited in Montana.  BNSF operates on 2,135 
miles of track, while the only other Class I railroad in the state, UP, operates 125 
miles of track.  Regional operators include Montana Rail Link (MRL) and Dakota, 
Missouri Valley and Western Railroad, Inc. (DMVWR).  The regional classification 
for DMVWR is misleading as the railroad only operates 57 miles of track in 
Montana.  While MRL operates a large amount of track (812 miles), it serves as a 
bridge carrier for BNSF and consequently does not provide intramodal 
competition.  MRL operates and maintains the track, however BNSF still owns the 
mainline.  MRL must obtain permission from BNSF to perform interchange with 
any other railroad and origins on the MRL line are treated as BNSF origins.  
Furthermore, BNSF has agreed to provide a given level of bridge traffic on the line, 
tying much of MRL traffic and financial health to that of BNSF.  DMVWR is 
affiliated with the Canadian Pacific Railroad (CP) and ties into CP lines in central 
North Dakota.  Other short lines include Central Montana Rail, Inc. (87 miles), 
Montana Western Rail Co. (59 miles), and Rarus Railway Company (69 miles).  
However each links to one or the other Class I railroads, thus not providing 
competition.  Figure 1 reflects the railroads operating in Montana in 2008. 
 Until recent years, hard red spring wheat has been the primary type of 
wheat grown in Montana.  As reflected in Table 1.2, 2007 spring wheat production 
was just over 55.2 million bushels, while 2005 and 2006 production was 81.6 and 
63.8 million bushels, respectively (NASS). The 2006 and 2007 production is 
indicative of the impact of multiple years of drought in the region, causing the low 
total wheat production since 2003.  This has forced many customary spring wheat
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Figure 1.1: Montana Rail Map, 2008 
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 production areas to rotate to more drought sustainable winter wheat.  Hard red 
spring wheat production is primarily in the north central and northeast areas of the 
state.  These two areas accounted for over 42 million bushels of the 55 million 
produced in 2007 (NASS).  This area, while covering over 2.5 million acres in 
cropped acres alone, is serviced almost exclusively by BNSF.  Hard red spring 
wheat is not produced in abundant quantities in barge competitive regions of the 
country, suggesting that rail rates in Montana are unlikely to be constrained by 
competing traffic in other regions that moves at lower rail rates.  In other words, 
geographic competition is unlikely to be significant for Montana wheat. 
Table 1.2: Montana Wheat Production 2003 – 2007 
(Thousands of Bushels)
Year Winter Wheat Durum Wheat Other Spring Wheat Total Wheat
2003 67,340 14,490 60,500 142,330
2004 66,830 17,985 88,350 173,165
2005 94,500 16,380 81,600 192,480
2006 82,560 6,715 63,800 153,075
2007 83,220 11,400 55,200 149,820
Total 394,450 66,970 349,450 810,870
Average 2003-2007 78,890 13,394 69,890 162,174
Source: U.S. Department of Agriculture, National Agricultural Statistics Service
Retrieved June 10, 2008 from http://www.nass.usda.gov/QuickStats  
 While there have been many studies of railroad pricing of agricultural 
commodities, few of these have focused on Montana, where the competitive 
restraints on rail grain prices appear to be minimal.  The overall objective of this 
thesis is to investigate railroad pricing behavior in the shipment of Montana wheat.  
Specific objectives include the following: 
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1.  Develop a model to measure the impacts of railroad costs and competition on 
rail rates for Montana wheat. 
2.  Identify and measure the principal cost determinants of rail prices such as 
distance, shipment volume, and weight per car. 
3.  Measure intramodal competition by comparing rail rates in a captive market 
(Montana) to one with more intramodal competition (Kansas). 
1.1 Thesis Statement 
 Montana has limited intramodal competition for grain shipments across the 
state and has been called a captive shipper due to the lack of rail competition.  By 
comparing a location with intramodal competition, would the presence of that 
competition provide reduced shipping rates for wheat transportation in Montana?   
1.2 Organization 
 The document is composed of six chapters and one appendix.  Chapter 1 is 
an introduction to the thesis topic and the organization of the paper.  Chapter 2 is a 
literature review, a summary of selected pertinent publications and their potential 
application to the thesis.  Chapter 3 is a discussion of the theoretical basis of the 
research.  Chapter 4 is a discussion of the research methods and the proposed 
model to address the thesis problem. Chapter 5 is a discussion of the data 
methods and the quantitative analysis of the topic. Chapter 6 is a discussion of the 
findings of the research and its potential application.  The attached appendix 
includes additional reference information that may contribute to understanding of 
the thesis.  
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CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW 
 The depth of literature addressing the issue of competition in the railroad 
transportation industry is significant, providing various degrees of analysis as to 
the impact of competition within the industry. Much of the analysis investigates the 
impact of deregulation after the Staggers Rail Act of 1980.   A significant amount of 
the literature is regional in scope and occurred in the decade post-Staggers.  
Change continues within the railroad industry as both technology and infrastructure 
advancements have occurred.  These factors provide inherent limitations to the 
findings of prior studies and will continue to do so with any such study as the 
regional nature of the railroad transportation networks vary.  What follows is not a 
complete survey of the prior research conducted related to railroad competition; 
however, the works cited provide a foundation and background for the 
development of a railroad pricing model.  Emphasis of this review is on the factors 
that affect railroad competition on rail grain transportation prices.  
 The research article often cited in the works below is a piece entitled, 
“Impact of the Staggers Rail Act on Agriculture: A Kansas Case Study”, Babcock, 
Sorenson, Chow and Klindworth (1985).  One objective of the study was to 
describe and quantify rail initiatives in the Kansas wheat transportation market 
following the implementation of the Staggers Act.  They found in the four year 
period of 1981 through 1984 substantial railroad reduction had occurred in the 
level and arrangement of railroad rates.  A pattern of rate changes suggested 
competition among railroads and between individual railroads and truck-barge 
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combinations.  They found that tariff rates to the Gulf of Mexico, in the post-
Staggers time frame had been reduced by 34%, compared to a 64% increase in 
the four years preceding Staggers. 
 MacDonald (1989) examined Waybill samples as means of quantifying the 
impact of deregulation on export grain rail shipping rates for wheat, corn and 
soybeans.  Using regression analysis, he found that interrail competition was 
strongest for corn, and when rail service goes from monopoly to a duopoly, it leads 
to a rate decline of 18%.  Moving further to a triopoly, rates declined at a smaller 
rate of 11%.  He also found that access to water movement impacted rates as rail 
rates increased as barge competition became less likely.  This was most 
noticeable on the rates associated with the transportation of wheat as wheat 
origins are typically significantly greater distances from water than that of either 
corn or soybeans.  MacDonald found that shippers who were 400 miles from barge 
access paid rates 40% more than those 100 miles away.  He concluded that 
concentration measures in all crop reporting areas indicated tight oligopolies and  
the addition of a competitor makes a difference.  Competition from barges has a 
strong impact.   
 Chow (1986) examined rail grain rate changes for the Central Plains in the 
post-Staggers period 1981-1986.  He assessed the magnitude of rail rate 
reductions for domestic and export markets as well as examined the change in 
patterns of rates among rail firms within different regions of the Central Plains.  His 
analysis indicated an overall reduction in rates for wheat in the five year period 
after Staggers of 34.5%, with the rate reductions occurring most significantly in the 
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export markets.  He found that railroads adopted different strategies for rate-
adjustments with some being very consistent in their rate changes over their entire 
systems, while others had greater rate reductions for some routes and less with 
others.  While rail contracts between carriers and shippers were not available for 
the analysis, Chow asserted that the contract rates would be significantly lower 
than the published rates.  This would show a greater impact in the rate reductions 
than the data used for the analysis indicated. 
 Adam and Anderson (1985) examined the effect of the Staggers Act on the 
level of country elevator bid prices and if there was indeed an increase in bid 
prices since Staggers passage.  Using econometric models with corn and soybean 
elevator bid prices in Nebraska, they found that both corn and soybean bid prices 
were increased.  However the impact on soybeans was higher at a level up to 14 
cents per bushel.  The impact on corn appeared to be offset by competing elevator 
bids.  However, the study also identified the buildup of capacity for the transport of 
corn and the decline in the export market at the time, both exigent circumstances 
such that the rail rate reduction was not seen in the increase of bid prices for corn.  
The capacity build up during the time frame reflected the growth of unit train 
activity.  In 1977, there were only eight elevators in Nebraska with unit train 
handling capabilities. By 1982 the growth in unit train handling facilities combined 
with the decline in export markets provided over 200% of the capacity necessary 
to move corn to the West Coast ports. 
 Kwon, Babcock, and Sorenson (1994) studied the impacts of Staggers in 
the latter half of the 1980s as most prior studies investigated the impact 
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immediately post-Staggers.  They investigated whether railroads have the ability to 
practice differential pricing in a highly competitive and unregulated market as well 
as sought to measure the determinants of rail differential pricing specific to the 
transportation of Kansas wheat.  Through the development of two econometric 
models, one for intra Kansas shipments and one for export movements, to account 
for the average car size differences (10 cars for intra Kansas and 20 for export); 
they found that differential pricing was practiced by railroads in both cases.  They 
also found substantial differences in determining the factors affecting rate-to-
variable cost ratios (R/VC) for intra Kansas wheat movements versus that of export 
Kansas wheat movements.   
 They observed that R/VC ratios increased steadily through the period of 
1986 to 1989, however, they hypothesized it could have been the result of export 
demand diminishing over the time frame.  They also found that the disclosure of 
previously confidential contracts reduced the incentive to negotiate contracts and 
subsequently the published tariff rate was used by railroads and shippers.  They 
found that even though R/VC increased over the time frame, it may not have had a 
negative consequence as a railroad received a 125.8 R/VC (at that time) and was 
more likely to be able to provide adequate service and replace capital, versus that 
of a railroad unable to cover its variable cost.  Finally, they indicated geographic 
competition is likely to constrain increases in R/VC rates for railroads within 
Kansas for wheat as at some point increased R/VC railroad ratios will induce 
diversion of Kansas wheat from Texas Gulf ports to other markets.  This is also 
likely the case for non-Kansas origins. 
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 Fuller et al (1987) conducted a study to measure the impact of deregulation 
on export-grain rates using a procedure that attempted to correct for shortcomings 
of earlier research studies.  The specified procedure controls for impact of events 
which may be coincident with deregulation and, in addition, circumvents the 
problem associated with inaccessible rate information included in the confidential 
contracts.  The procedure is applied to major export –grain transportation corridors 
linking the central and south Plains and Corn Belt Regions with their respective 
port areas. 
 The Fuller et al. study identified five regions that included the states of 
Kansas, Iowa and Indiana as well as the Texas Panhandle and a portion of Illinois.  
Kansas and The Texas Panhandle represented surplus producers of hard red 
winter wheat, representing half of the U.S.’s annual wheat production and about 
63% of wheat exports.  Those regions rely heavily on rail for export transportation, 
with 90% of western Kansas wheat transported on rail and 75% of northeast 
Kansas and the Texas Panhandle wheat shipped by rail. 
 The effects of deregulation on export-grain railroad price structures were 
identified with the analysis focusing on the price spread between port and 
associated hinterland region.  In general the adopted procedure involves the 
estimation of regression equations which include hinterland’s farm-to-port price 
spread (m) as the dependent variable and independent variables which control 
shifts in demand and supply schedules; region and two dummies; a time trend ; 
and a dummy and an interaction term to isolate changes in rates that may have 
resulted from the 1980 Staggers deregulation. 
 13 
 
 Fuller et al. found deregulation to have had a significant effect on rail 
transportation corridors linking the Plains states of Kansas and Texas with Gulf 
ports and a relatively modest impact on the corridor linking Indiana with East Cost 
ports.  Kansas and Texas corridors had estimated real rate declines of $.37 and 
$.31 per bushel during the 1981-1985 period.  In the Indiana corridor, deregulation 
is estimated to have decreased rates by $.08 per bushel.  Additional analysis 
indicated that the effect of deregulation in state subregions may have differed from 
the estimated state wide effect.  
 The Iowa and Illinois regression models show deregulation to have had little 
sustained statistically significant effect on rates in the regions linked with the Gulf 
Ports. In contrast to the findings in the Plains, barge rates have an extremely 
important effect on corridor price spreads.  In the Illinois and Iowa models a dollar 
decline in rates served to reduce the price spread by $.51 and $.73 per bushel 
while the impact for Indiana was $.38 per bushel.  To the analyst it seemed that 
much of the decline in Corn Belt price spreads during the post-Staggers era can 
be attributed to declining barge rates, not to a reduction in rail rates. 
 Koo, Tolliver and Bitzan (1993) investigated railroad pricing behavior in 
North Dakota, a seemingly captive railroad shipping market focusing on the rail 
transportation characteristics of the Upper Great Plains region.  They argued that 
the region had unique railroad transportation characteristics when compared to 
other regions of the United States.  These characteristics included limited 
intermodal competition due to great distances to barge loading facilities and large 
distances to major markets of consumption, processing and export.  They 
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developed an econometric model applying data related to car weight, distance, 
intramodal competition, intermodal competition and variables associated with three 
respective crops, and the season of the year.  Their research found that distance, 
volume and weight per car all have significant negative effects on rates; intramodal 
and intermodal competition had significant effects on rail rates suggesting that the 
two Class I railroads in the state at the time were competing with each other and 
with barge and truck movements from North Dakota.  
 Thompson, Hauser and Coughlin (1990) also evaluated the competitive 
pressures on railroad rate-to-variable (R/VC) ratios for export shipments of corn 
and wheat both pre- and post-Staggers.  Through the development of four 
regression models, two for corn and two for wheat, they found that the corn results 
were less significant than those for wheat as shipment size for wheat likely reflects 
the impact of expanded multi-car services post-Staggers.  They found that there 
was a lack of identifiable differences in pre- and post- deregulation pricing which 
may be attributable to the close correlation between changes in certain operating 
factors such as shipment size and destination opportunity.  Their study concluded 
that their results did not indicate a clear effect of the Staggers Rail act on rail rate 
competitiveness. 
 These works and several others provide a collective review of the impact of 
the Staggers Rail Act on competition and rail rates as well as some regional 
considerations when one is examining the factors associated with rail rate 
competition.   Limitations were often identified and those factors should be 
considered as one conducts further study of the topic.  Furthermore, as addressed 
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in the introduction of this review, other factors associated with the rail 
transportation industry have occurred in the time frame since several of these 
works were completed, especially in Montana. 
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CHAPTER 3: THEORY 
 Examination of the markets that railroads operate in provides a basis for the 
pricing that exists in the grain transportation sector.  The theory to be examined 
include those areas related to firms that operate in a particular market structure, 
more specifically a railroad that operates with competition, as a monopoly, and 
finally; as an oligopoly.  The need for railroad reform will briefly be addressed 
followed by a brief description of each market type and its application to railroad 
transportation industry. The chapter concludes with an intermodal transportation 
system theory review. 
3.1 Railroad Reform Rationale 
 This paper has previously discussed many aspects of the Staggers 
Railroad Act of 1980, typically in terms of impacts after the implementation of the 
legislation.  The implementation of Staggers was seen as a necessary tool to 
promote the reform necessary for the financial well being of the railroad industry.  
Through the 1950s widespread financial problems arose and in the late 1960s and 
early 1970s several railroads in the eastern U.S. filed for bankruptcy.  Government 
intervention in the northeastern railroad network formed the Conrail system after 
financial collapse of the one of the major eastern carriers.  Through the late 1970s 
bankruptcy was also experienced with the three Midwestern railroads, one of 
which, the Milwaukee Road, had trackage through Montana. 
 These railroad failures brought on the political necessity to implement 
reform with the first major reform act, the Rail Revitalization and Regulatory 
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Reform (4R) of 1976.  The act allowed improved pricing flexibility while easing 
restrictions for abandonments.  The Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) 
rather restrictively interpreted the act and important changes did not occur until the 
ICC composition changed in 1979.  This led to the ICC approving four major 
mergers, accelerated abandonments and the introduction of confidential contract 
rates.  These actions preceded the passage of the Staggers Act in 1980 and in 
some respects; Staggers validated the reform that ICC had already implemented.  
These measures were necessary to restore the financial viability of railroads and 
have contributed to the sustainability of the railroad transportation network within 
the U.S. today. 
3.2 Perfect Competition 
 Perfect competition in a market will reflect pricing according to the market 
supply and demand curves.  Increases in prices are represented on a supply curve 
to slope upward to the right resulting in increased industry output.  The market 
demand curve slopes downward and toward the right, as prices increase, demand 
for the product is reduced.  Essentially, the key aspect in a perfectly competitive 
market is that maximum profit exists at the output where marginal revenue (price) 
is equal to the output price. (Mansfield 2002).  Further, the barriers to entry are 
very low, requiring only a small investment to enter the industry.  There are a very 
large number of buyers and sellers, and the product is homogeneous. In the 
railroad industry, perfect competition is likely non-existent as there are a limited 
number of firms that actually compete.   The resources necessary to enter the 
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market discourage entry by others as a significant capital investment is required to 
build and operate a railroad. 
3.3 Monopoly  
 In a monopoly, the industry consists of one firm; a single seller of the 
product or service.  A monopolist will have considerable control over pricing as 
there is no additional competitor in the industry.  A monopolist in an unregulated 
market, if it maximizes profit, will price its product and produce the output at a point 
where marginal revenue is equal to marginal cost and marginal revenue is derived 
from the demand curve.  A monopolist, when free of direct competitor imposed 
restraints, can set higher prices, and generate higher profits than it would if it were 
exposed to the competition of a rival firm.  Entry to the market is essentially 
blocked. 
 Railroads reflect characteristics of a monopoly in a regional perspective 
throughout the U.S.  There are also locations where there is more then one 
railroad firm that may provide intermodal competition.  However, as discussed 
previously, the industry does experience intermodal competition from other firms 
within the transportation industry (barge and truck).  Furthermore, railroads are 
subject to government regulation limiting the ability of the industry to act as a true 
monopolist in those areas that lack firm competition. 
3.4 Oligopoly 
 An oligopoly is an intermediate situation between that of perfect competition 
and a monopoly where there only a few firms competing in a market.  An oligopoly 
is likely going to have less control over pricing than that of a monopoly, but more 
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than that of a perfectly competitive firm.  Barriers to entry are high in oligopoly and 
they tend to rely heavily on nonprice competition.  
 Oligopoly competition most accurately reflects railroads as grain shippers 
can utilize other modes (barge and truck) in some cases to transport grain to 
domestic markets.   
3.5 Intermodal Transportation System Theory 
 Grain shippers utilize three modes of transport to ship grain to markets: (1) 
rail, (2) truck, and (3) water. The least cost mode for a given grain shipment is a 
function of distance from origin to destination. In Figure 1, hypothetical modal cost 
curves are constructed for the rail, truck, and water modes between origin i and 
destination j. The hypothetical cost curve for trucking (T) indicates that trucks have 
a cost advantage for short hauls because they have insignificant fixed and terminal 
costs relative to other modes. The cost curve for water shipment (W) shows that 
water movements have the lowest unit costs with respect to distance but 
significantly higher fixed or terminal costs than other modes. Thus water has the 
highest trip costs for short distance movements and the lowest costs for long haul 
shipments. The railroad cost structure (R) lies between the short haul cost 
advantage of trucks and the long haul advantage of water shipment.  
While the cost curves in Figure 1 are linear to simplify the modal relationships, 
costs increase at a decreasing rate with distance due to economies of long hauls. 
Carriers realize economies of long haul primarily because fixed terminal costs are 
spread over a great number of miles. If the freight rate is determined solely by 
costs, the transport market will be divided among modes, according to distance, 
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holding all other rate factors constant. Thus in Figure 1, motor carriers will have a 
cost advantage for distance OC, railroads will have the cost advantage for distance 
CD, and water will have the advantage for distances greater than OD. 
Figure 3.1: Hypothetical Trip Cost Curves for Rail (RR’), Truck (TT’), and 
Water (WW’), Modes of Transportation for a given Origin/Destination 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 In addition to cost factors such as distance, competitive factors have an 
impact on rail rates. Intermodal and intramodal competition constrains rail market 
power, and in markets where such competition exists, railroads will charge lower 
rates than in non-competitive markets. 
3.6 Theoretical Model 
The theoretical model is a variant of the model published in Koo et al 
(1993).  Equilibrium prices of rail transport of agricultural products are determined 
by demand for and supply of rail service. Demand for a railroad's service (qd) is a 
function of the price of the railroad's service (p1), the price of other railroads' 
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transport service (p2, p3... ), the prices of other modes of transport (a1, a2, ... ), 
and other factors affecting demand for rail transport (S). Thus the demand 
function is equation (1).  
(1) qd = fd(p1, p2, p3…, a1, a2, S) 
The supply of a railroad's service is a function of the price of the 
railroad’s service (p1), cost factors such as distance (d) and shipment volume 
(v), and other variables that affect the cost of rail service (C). Thus the supply 
function is equation (2).  
(2) qs = fs(p1, d, v, C ) 
In equilibrium, qd = qs, so equations (1) and (2) can be combined to form 
the equilibrium condition. Thus the equilibrium price equation for railroad (1) is as 
follows:  
(3) p1 = f1(p2, p3, …, a1, a2, d, v, S, C ) 
All the variables in equation (3) are as defined above.  
If the prices of other railroads (p2, p3) are defined as intramodal competition 
(iac) and the prices of other modes (a1, a2...) are defined as intermodal 
competition (ioc), then equation (3) can be rewritten as follows:  
(4) p1 = f(iac, ioc, v, S, C)  
 The following chapter applies the theoretical model to the empirical model 
to achieve the objectives of the study. 
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CHAPTER 4: EMPIRICAL MODEL 
 The theoretical model from the previous chapter is modified to achieve the 
objectives of the study.  As discussed in Chapter 3, intermodal competition is likely 
to be minimal for rail shipments of Montana wheat. The great majority of the 
shipments are long distance movements to Portland, making truck competition 
ineffective. The average distance to a water port is 522 miles rendering barge 
competition to be non-existent. The BNSF dominates the rail industry in Montana 
so intramodal competition is non-existent as well. The empirical model is specified 
as follows where all continuous variables are specified as natural logarithms so the 
coefficients are elasticity’s.  
(1) CWT =  β0 + β1CARWT + β2DIST + β3GVW + β4BARGE + β5DUMMY + εi 
CWT - Rail rate in dollars per cwt-mile for the shipment  
CARWT - Weight (lbs) of each loaded covered hopper rail car in a shipment 
DIST - Distance in rail miles between origins and export port 
GVW - Total shipment weight in tons  
BARGE - Distance of origin to barge loading facilities  
DUMMY - Dummy variable to represent either a Montana or Kansas location, 
Montana being assigned 1 and Kansas 0 
ε - random error term  
 The dependent variable (CWT) is the rail rate per hundred weight (cwt)-mile 
and can be obtained by dividing total revenue of the shipment by weight and 
distance. Calculation is further demonstrated in Table 4.1.  Variation in total 
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revenues of the shipment is obtained by varying the number of cars in the train, 
and variation in distance is obtained by varying the origin of the shipment. The total 
shipment weight (GVW) is obtained by varying the number of carloads in the train 
and multiplying by the weight per car (CARWT).  The distance variable (DIST) is 
the distance from various origins in Montana to Portland, Oregon and from various 
origins in Kansas to Houston, Texas. The distance of the origin to barge loading 
facilities (BARGE) is the distance from Montana origins to Lewiston, Idaho for the 
Montana equation, and the distance from Kansas origins to Kansas City, Missouri 
in the Kansas equation. Variation in weight per car (CARWT) is introduced by 
assuming various car sizes, i.e., 268,000 pound cars vs. 286,000 pound cars.  
Figure 4.1: Method for Calculation for BNSF Rates Per Cwt-Mile 
 
(1) Total Revenue of Shipment = Number of cars in the shipment x rate per 
car. 
(2) Weight of the Shipment = Number of cars in the shipment x weight per 
car/100. 
(3) Divide (1) by (2) to get Revenue per cwt. 
(4) Divide (3) by distance of shipment to get Revenue per cwt-mile. 
(5) Multiply (4) by 1000 to get into integer form. 
  
 The theoretically expected sign of the natural log of the distance variable is 
negative. A large share of railroad costs are fixed with respect to distance, such as 
loading and clerical costs, insurance, taxes, interest, and managerial overhead. As 
these costs are spread over more miles, the costs per mile decrease at a 
decreasing rate, so the change in the rail rate per cwt-mile falls as distance 
increases.  
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 The GVW variable reflects (a) the number of cars in the shipment, and (b) 
the weight per car. Since the empirical model includes the commodity weight per 
car (CARWT), the volume variable reflects the impact on rail rates of increased 
cars in the shipment. Because a large share of rail costs are fixed with respect to 
weight, railroads also realize economies of weight. Thus the change in rail rates 
per cwt-mile are expected to decrease at a decreasing rate as volume increases.  
Intermodal competition is measured by highway miles to water ports. Longer 
distances to water access points reduce the feasibility of truck-barge competition 
for rail wheat shipments. Thus, the theoretically expected sign of BARGE is 
positive since the greater the distance to water ports the greater the pricing power 
of railroads.  
  Weight per car (CARWT) is expected to have a negative relationship to the 
change in rail rates per cwt-mile. Because operating costs such as switching costs 
per car, labor costs, clerical costs, and various other costs are fixed per car, these 
costs per car decrease as car weight increases. Thus the change in rail rates per 
cwt-mile fall as car weight rises.  
 The empirical model is estimated for Montana and Kansas. For Montana, 
the shipments in the empirical model are from Montana wheat origins to Portland, 
Oregon for export. For Kansas, the modeled wheat shipments are from Kansas 
origins to the export ports at Houston. Like Montana, intermodal competition is 
limited in the Kansas wheat transport market. The distance to Houston makes 
truck competition non-existent, and historically only negligible amounts of Kansas 
wheat have been shipped on the Missouri and Arkansas Rivers. However, unlike 
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Montana, Kansas is served by both the BNSF and UP. The lines of the two 
railroads are in close physical proximity in many cases, and they have roughly the 
same number of Kansas track miles (1,260 miles for BNSF and 1,505 miles for 
UP).  Then intramodal competition is introduced by pooling the data of the two 
states and inserting a dummy variable in the equation for all Montana 
observations.  
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CHAPTER 5: DATA AND EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
5.1 Data 
 The model is estimated, using rates published on the BNSF website 
(www.bnsf.com.) for wheat movements in Montana to Portland and Kansas to 
Houston.  This is believed to be the best data available as it represents accurate 
shipping charges published by BNSF.  The published rates were taken from the 
website on November 4, 2008 for each respective car type and train size.  The 
BNSF website was further used to gather the rail shipping miles from each origin to 
the port destination.    
Table 5.1: Montana and Kansas Truck Miles from Origins 
 
Truck Mileage to nearest barge facility - Montana origins to Lewiston, ID
Glendive 786
Harlem 452
Collins 410 Average
Pompeys 597 511
Shelby 449
Carter 413.5
Rudyard 511
Grove 467
Truck Mileage to nearest barge facility - Kansas origins to Kansas City, MO
Wichita 199
Wellington 226
Salina 175 Average
Hutchinson 217 239
Garden City 387.5
Dodge City 335
Concordia 223
Abilene 151  
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 The model uses eight locations in Kansas and Montana identified in Table 
5.1.  The table also identifies the distance in miles to the nearest barge location. 
Other data used for the model included distance in rail miles from points of origin 
to export in Montana and Kansas respectively.  The wheat export destination for all 
Montana origins was Portland, Oregon; while the wheat export location for all 
Kansas locations was Houston, Texas. 
Table 5.2: Mean and Standard Deviation of Variables 
 
Variables CARWT DIST GVW BARGE CWT
Combined Mean 277000 886.567 11697.923 427.212 1.325
Combined Standard Deviation 9021.713 152.516 5679.549 165.155 0.228
Montana Mean 277000 946.875 11141.556 510.750 1.252
Montana Standard Deviation 9031.414 137.490 5655.667 118.677 0.178
Kansas Mean 277000 750.875 12949.750 239.250 1.487
Kansas Standard Deviation 9071.147 80.649 5575.328 76.233 0.244
   
 Table 5.2 is the mean and the standard deviation of the data series for the 
variables.  The mean and standard deviation is reflected for the combined data 
series and Montana and Kansas individually. Table 5. reflects the Montana and 
Kansas locations and the respective rail mileage for each. 
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Table 5.3: Montana and Kansas Rail Miles from Origins 
 
Origin
Glendive
Harlem
Collins
Pompeys
Shelby
Carter
Rudyard
Grove
Rail mileage Montana Origins to 
Portland, Oregon
Rail Mileage
1245
925
839
1054
785
909
849
969  
Origin
Wichita
Wellington
Salina
Hutchinson
Garden City
Dodge City
Concordia
Abilene
Rail mileage Kansas Origins to 
Houston, Texas
Rail Mileage
646
631
775
752
702
872
822
807
 
5.2 Empirical Results 
     Table 5.3 reflects the results of the regression estimated with ordinary 
least squares.  Model outcome has an adjusted R-squared of 0.74 and the 
standard error of regression is 0.11 with the standard dependent variable at 0.22.  
Probability factor for each variable is close to zero with CARWT having the highest 
level of 0.0047.   The signs and magnitudes of the statistically significant 
parameters appear reasonable given the outlined theoretical framework.   
 
 29 
 
Table 5.4: Railroad Rate Regression Equation 
 
Method: Least Squares
Sample: 208
Included observations: 208
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
C 1.860065 0.253147 7.347764 0
CARWT 2.52E-06 8.82E-07 2.859597 0.0047
DIST -0.001199 0.000124 -9.644381 0
GVW -2.28E-05 1.42E-06 -16.10731 0
BARGE 0.000519 0.000142 3.651677 0.0003
DUMMY -0.182486 0.027907 -6.539061 0
R-squared 0.754499     Mean dependent var 1.324604
Adjusted R-squared 0.748422     S.D. dependent var 0.227749
S.E. of regression 0.114233     Akaike info criterion -1.472723
Sum squared resid 2.635955     Schwarz criterion -1.376448
Log likelihood 159.1632     F-statistic 124.1611
Durbin-Watson stat 1.11315     Prob(F-statistic) 0  
 All the explanatory variables were statistically significant at the .01 level 
except for CARWT.  Independent variables DIST and GVW had the theoretically 
expected negative sign, while BARGE had the expected positive sign.  The 
expected sign of CARWT is negative, so the positive sign was not expected.  
However, given the small size of the coefficient, CARWT has minimal impact on 
the dependent variable. 
 The most unexpected result was the statistically significant negative sign for 
the dummy variable, indicating that wheat rail rates are lower in Montana than 
Kansas.  This finding does not agree with previous research with found that rail 
wheat rates are higher in North Dakota and Montana compared to the other wheat 
producing areas.  The reasons for the observed higher wheat rail rates in Montana 
are a topic for further research.  
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CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSION 
 The objectives of this thesis were to develop a model to measure railroad 
costs and competition; determine the principal cost determinants and measure 
intramodal competition by comparing the rates in a captive market (Montana) to 
one with more intramodal competition (Kansas).     
 The empirical model reflects key cost components and competition impacts 
on the rates associated with rail shipments of wheat out of Montana and Kansas.  
The empirical model regression outcomes reflect a reasonable goodness of fit for 
the variables established as determinants of cost.  The model indicates rates of a 
captive market like Montana may not be higher then those with more intramodal 
competition such as Kansas. 
 Because this finding doesn’t agree with previous research, other factors 
may contribute to the price determinants of rail competition and further study such 
as a revenue to variable cost assessment may find similar findings of prior 
research.  
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